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ABSTRACT: The aim of our study is to shed light on auditors’ cognitive drivers of bias inherent

in long-term personal relationships with clients. We examine whether a long-term personal
relationship invokes a conscious misjudgement because of a mutual long-term financial
interest, or an unconscious bias invoked by affective motives and unconscious needs. The
paper combines two theories, the first being the incentive based motivated reasoning (Kunda,
1990) and the second the need based motivation theory (McClelland, 1987). We analyse the
problem with a two-player perfect-information sequential game within the framework of
game theory, involving an accounting choice task. We find that the positive effect of a personal
relationship on biased decision-making is mediated by a long-term financial interest rather
than by an affective motive such as friendship. Unconscious needs are also found to influence
subjects’ decisions. In other words, the need for achievement and the need for power reinforce
auditor independent opinion and help them resist the pressure from clients, whereas the need
for affiliation is accentuated in a personal relationship and positively affects auditor bias. The
study provides an original empirical investigation of the drivers of behaviour in the auditing
setting, while its results indicate that both conscious financial incentives and unconscious
needs influence subjects’ decisions simultaneously.
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1

INTRODUCTION

Auditor independence is considered the most important characteristic of the audit
profession due to its impact on the audit quality and confidence in financial reporting.
The aim of the major reform in 2014 (Directive 2014/56/EU, Regulation No. 537/2014) is
to improve statutory audits in the European Union by reinforcing auditor independence
and auditor professional scepticism towards the management of an audited company. The
new rules require audit reports to be more detailed and informative, and auditor work
to be more closely monitored with strengthened audit committees. Most importantly,
a mandatory rotation of auditors for public interest entities is introduced, requiring
companies to retender their auditor every 10 years and what is more, change the auditor
at least every 20 years.
1 University of Ljubljana, School of Economics and Business, Ljubljana, Slovenia, e-mail: mina.licen@ef.uni-lj.si
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Despite the major reform, auditor independence remains a hotly debated issue by
the European regulators, practitioners and the research community. The intent of the
mandatory rotation of auditors is to address concerns about familiarity and self-interest
threats between auditors and their clients, however, the threat of familiarity persists in the
auditor-client relationship (European Commission, 2010).
Although acknowledging that the two directional goals, namely financial incentives and
personal relationship, lead to biases, the so far research in auditing has downplayed the
distinction between the two. In most papers, a personal relationship equals a long-term
financial benefit (Hackenbrack and Nelson, 1996; Prentice, 2000; Kadous, Kennedy
and Peecher, 2003; Blay, 2005; Kadous, Magro and Spilker, 2008). The first paper that
simultaneously examines both incentives is the Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman (2010)
study. While their experimental results do not confirm a significant effect of a personal
relationship on auditor decision-making neither in the absence nor in the presence of
financial incentives, the authors show that the subjects internalize their role of auditors
and are unable to debias their decision in a different role (Moore et al., 2010).
Slapničar, Zaman Groff and Lončarski (2015) continue the investigation of a personal
relationship by referring to a number of studies, explaining the development of affect2 in a
long-term relationship (e.g. Neuberg and Fiske, 1987; Bamber and Iyer, 2007; Nelson, 2009).
Through strengthening the measurement of a personal relationship, they find significant
effects of both financial incentives and the personal relationship on biased decisionmaking, suggesting that a personal relationship creates different bases for bias in the
form of financial incentives. Furthermore, they report that the oversight risk significantly
mitigates bias arising from financial incentive, whereas a personal relationship almost
completely offsets this effect. Subjects in a personal relationship condition committing
bias were in their study insensitive to oversight risk. The authors interpret this finding as
an indication of bias that arises from affect.
Our study differs from the previous studies in that it focuses on the question whether
a long-term personal relationship between an auditor and a client invokes deliberate
misjudgement because of a conscious decision-making process to maximise financial
interest, or unconscious bias due to affective decision-making which however does not
serve exclusively to the maximisation of financial interest.
The analysis advances the incentive-based theory of motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990)
by shedding light on the controversy whether motivated reasoning is a conscious or
unconscious cognitive process. According to Forgas (1995), there is little room for an
affect in motivated reasoning, as it is strongly influenced by a directional goal if an affect
and a financial incentive are incongruent. This is however not the case in a long-term
2 Affect is a generic term for a mood and emotion, the former indicating low intensity, enduring state without
a clear cause, and the latter referring to a more intense, short lived state with a clear cause (Forgas, 1995, p. 41).
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relationship between an auditor and a client, during which the two incentives become
aligned.
External incentives such as financial goals and aroused affect do not entirely account
for human behaviour, as another important driver of behaviour that needs to be
considered is the unconscious needs (McClelland, 1985; Khandekar, 2012). According
to the motivational needs theory, the unconscious needs permanently influence one’s
behaviour (McClelland, 1987). We therefore complement our analysis of incentives by the
unconscious needs and look at how incentives and the needs combine in pursuing a goal.
In particular, we hypothesise that the need for affiliation, i.e. the need to affiliate with
people, the desire to please them, is likely to positively affect the auditor’s support of the
client’s preferences, particularly in a long-term personal relationship with the client. The
need for achievement, i.e. the need to excel in results, and the need for power, i.e. the need
to have influence, power, and control over others, are on the other hand assumed to induce
auditor independence in a way that the auditor resists the client’s preferences.
To analyse these questions, we conducted a between-subjects randomized two-period
sequential game that involves an accounting choice task. We use a two personal relationship
versus non-personal relationship by one factorial design with randomly distributed
covariates. Thus, a total of 190 subjects are included in the experiment, in which the
selected subjects assume the roles of the auditor and the client respectively. The results
of the experiment confirm that a personal relationship has a significant positive effect on
the auditor’s decision in favour of the client. This is evident in that in order to support the
client’s preferences, auditors in a personal relationship significantly more often give up on
their short-term outcome to build up a long-term relationship.
The study is an original empirical investigation of the drivers of decision-making in an
auditor-client setting. The results of our study contribute to the findings in prior literature
by showing that in the heart of biased decision-making there lies a long-term financial
benefit for both parties. We establish that unconscious bias arises from unconscious
needs, rather than from the affect created in a long-term relationship, however, a personal
relationship seems to accentuate the need for affiliation. The paper contributes to a body
of literature investigating biases in auditor decision-making, building on the motivated
reasoning and the motivational needs theory respectively. Understanding the underlying
cognitive processes created by various incentives and the needs conduces importantly to
the insight into the effectiveness of different regulatory measures intended to alleviate any
threat in auditor independence. Such evidence can be an addition to the recent regulatory
discussions on the measures against auditor dependence.
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

Generally, people are prone to behaviours that offer positive incentives and are averse to
behaviours associated with negative incentives (Bernstein and Nash, 2008). According to
Johnstone, Sutton and Warfield (2001), auditor decisions may be trimmed down to direct
and indirect incentives. The direct incentives include an actual or a potential financial
benefit. The adverse influence of financial incentives on the auditor’s decision-making
in a long-term relationship has so far been extensively examined and the findings are
largely consistent (DeAngelo, 1981; Farmer, Rittenberg and Trompeter, 1987; Mednick
and Previts, 1987; Lord, 1992; Blay, 2005; Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman, 2006;
Moore et al., 2010). The indirect incentives, on the other hand, derive from circumstances
which make it difficult for the auditor to maintain objectivity. What is more, a long-term
personal relationship between an auditor and a client has been found to create situations
in which the auditor is hesitant to act with the professional rigor and is unwilling to impair
a relationship with the client (Johnstone et al., 2001).
According to the theory of motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990), direct and indirect
incentives create directional goals that lead to cognitive biases. Whilst there is little
dispute that an economic dependence has influenced the auditor’s decision-making,
more controversy surrounds the personal relationship. Knap and Knap (2012) suggest
that exaggerated desire to please the client is not regarded as a cognitive bias, but as a
common symptom of impaired auditor independence, whereas Neuberg and Fiske (1987),
Moore et al. (2010) and Slapničar et al. (2015) propose that a personal relationship creates
unconscious, affective bias.
Kunda (1990) and Blay (2005) suggest that information processing and making a decision
invoked by a directional goal occur unconsciously. There are however two indications
that bias may occur deliberately, the first one being that bias takes place only if the choices
are ambiguous. In such a setting, the decision-makers are able to support the choice with
seemingly objective arguments, although if the opposite directional goal is present, they
may make a case for precisely reverse arguments. The second indication is the empirical
finding, indicating professionals are susceptible to a high practice risk or a reputation
impairment. Such a condition severely alleviates biased decision-making (Kadous et al.,
2003; Blay, 2005; Kadous et al., 2008, Hope and Langli, 2010). According to Forgas (1995),
motivated reasoning involves highly predetermined and directed information search
patterns that serve to a pre-existing goal. This judgmental strategy is one of the least
susceptible strategies to the influence of affect. In case the prevailing affective state of the
decision-maker is incongruent with the goal, the affect is unlikely to influence judgements.
This is however not the case when the affect is aligned with the goal.
In psychology, cold cognition has become increasingly acknowledged as rather the
exception than the rule, and this affect is involved in almost every decision (Forgas,
1995). A long-term personal relationship may arise feelings of familiarity, what is more,
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several studies report that familiarity in a long-lasting personal relationship induces the
auditor’s identification with the client’s interest (Johnstone et al., 2001; Bamber and Iyer,
2007; Nelson, 2009; Ye, Carson and Simnett, 2011). Berscheid, Graziano, Monson and
Dermer (1976) and Neuberg and Fiske (1987) show that outcome dependency influences
impression formation, in other words, it increases liking somebody which may in turn
lead to bias decision-making that is no longer based on utility maximisation. The fact that
an incentive arising from the personal relationship with the client is congruent with the
financial interest of the auditor, blurs the distinction of which incentives are at work in a
long-term relationship.
If familiarity explains the choices arising from a personal relationship, this suggests
that a personal relationship creates an affective (unconscious) directional goal beyond a
financial incentive. If, on the other hand, the essence of a personal relationship is in the
development of mutual trust that serves long-term financial interest of both parties, it may
be considered a conscious motive. To investigate this question, we hypothesise:
H1: Familiarity mediates a positive effect of a personal relationship on the auditor’s choice in
the client’s interest.
H2: Financial interest mediates a positive effect of a personal relationship on the auditor’s
choice in the client’s interest.
The stimulus for affective reaction may come from the external world or from within
the individual. Khandekar (2012) argues that individuals do not only behave in response
to goals such as rewards and punishments but are also driven by their internal needs.
Motivation theories differ along the line whether external stimuli or internal factors drive
human behaviour. According to the most prominent need theorists, Murray, Maslow and
McClelland (in Khandekar, 2012), the primacy of motivation lies with internal factors or
needs. Needs may be innate (instinctual), learned at a very early age or acquired later over
the course of life, and are relatively stable characteristics of a personality. Nevertheless,
the intensity of needs changes with respect to the engagement of an individual to satisfy a
certain need.
Among various need theories we draw on the McClelland’s (1987) classification of needs
which seems to be most relevant to decision-making context in auditing. McClelland
(1987) classifies human needs as the need for achievement, the need for power and the
need for affiliation respectively.
People with a high need for achievement have a strong desire to excel, need to take personal
responsibility and show successful task results, require to attain a high standard and to
overcome obstacles. They strive to accomplish something difficult, to master people and
ideas (McClelland, 1987). They do this as independently as possible. Their self-regard is
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increased by the successfully accomplished exercise (after Murray, in McClelland, 1987).
They prefer situations in which they have personal responsibility for the outcome and as
McClelland and Boyatzis (1982) explain, they have a tendency to influence others to do
well. An auditor with a high need for achievement may put objectivity in reporting before
his or her financial interest. Nevertheless, a high need for achievement incorporates also
the urge to conduct an audit up to high standards. Thus, we propose that this need is likely
to help the auditor to resist the pressure from the client.
H3: The need for achievement negatively affects the auditor’s choices in the client’s interest.
The need for power represents the need and desire to have influence, power, and control
over others. High need for power is mainly expressed by the competitive behaviour and
an individual’s tendency to maintain or increase their validity in others. People with high
need for power are not only less susceptible to others, but also have desire to influence and
control others (McClelland, 1987). For these reasons, we propose that this need is likely
to lead the auditor to resist the pressure from the client and not act in his or her interest,
regardless of their relationship.
H4: The need for power negatively affects the auditor’s choices in the client’s interest.
The need for affiliation reflects one’s tendency to seek harmonious relationships, develop
and maintain close personal relationships, do things with people, that is a need to feel
accepted by other people and the desire to please others (McClelland, 1987). The need
for affiliation is defined as “a concern over establishing, maintaining, or restoring a positive
affective relationship with another person or a group of persons” (Heyns, Veroff and Atkinson,
1992). People with a high need for affiliation are considered as being less assertive, more
obedient, agreeable and dependent on other people (McClelland, 1987). An auditor with
a high need for affiliation may set maintenance of a positive relationship with the client
before objectivity in reporting. An auditor with a high need for affiliation is therefore more
likely to support the client’s interest.
H5: The need for affiliation positively affects the auditor’s choices in the client’s interest.
The need for affiliation may become dominant in a relationship that embodies familiarity.
Thompson (1995) shows that even the most superficial affiliation in a relationship leads
to an interpretation of ambiguous information in the desirable direction of the other
person in the relationship. Based on the latter, we hypothesise that a personal relationship
increases the effect of the need for affiliation.
H6: The positive effect of the need for affiliation is accentuated in a personal relationship.
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In Figure 1 we present a conceptual model based on the proposed hypotheses.
Figure 1: Conceptual model

3

EXPERIMENTAL SETTING

Participants. To analyse the proposed model, we conducted a two-period choice-task
experiment with 190 senior undergraduate (26%) and graduate (74%) students of the
University of Ljubljana. To assure they are familiar with the accounting choice task, we
recruited the students majoring only in accounting and finance. The selected students
could earn compensation in the amount between EUR 0 and EUR 10, depending on their
decisions. The average total compensation amounted to EUR 5.3 (SD = 2.1, range = EUR
0-10) for a one-hour participation, which approximately represents the average hourly rate
of a student worker. The students’ average age is 22.6 years (SD = 2.7, range = 20-47 years),
59% of them are female, and their average work experience, including part-time student
work, is 3.6 years (ranging from 0 to 26). The subjects of the study, that is the students,
were then randomly assigned the roles of auditors and clients respectively, and matched in
pairs. However, as our analysis focuses primarily on the decision-making of auditors, we
were left with 95 observable answers.
The subjects in the role of clients were given this role to create an atmosphere of a personal
relationship in the client-auditor pairs in which they closely interacted. In addition, we
made use of a real friendship between the participants who were given the roles of auditors

44

ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS REVIEW | VOL. 22 | No. 1 | 2020

and clients as a proxy for familiarity which typically develops a the long-term auditorclient relationship. On the other hand, in a manipulated condition of a non-personal
relationship where auditors were seated alone and paired with unknown clients, the clients
were required to respond to the auditors’ decisions after the first round of the experiment.
In this way, auditors and their respective clients were able to communicate with each other
though without any direct personal interaction.
Design. The experiment used in the study was designed within the framework of game
theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) as a two-player perfect information
sequential game (Osborne, 2000). In game theory, this is a game with a strict order of play,
in which players are aware of not only everything that happens prior to making a decision
but also the financial consequences of the decision made.
In Figure 2, the design of the game and the auditors’ possible decisions as well as rewards
are presented using a decision tree.
Figure 2: The decision tree

Note: The auditor’s possible decisions and the reward appear in red, the client’s possible decisions and the reward
appear in blue, and the random choice of the computer in the second round appears in green. Abbreviation BS
denotes the auditor’s choice of approving accounting of development costs of the product X as an intangible asset
in the balance sheet (BS) of the client's company which is in the client’s interest. Abbreviation P/L denotes the
auditor’s choice to approve accounting of development costs of the product X as an expense in the profit and
loss account (P/L) of the client's company which is not in the client’s interest but is more adequate in terms of
accounting as it is based on more realistic predictions about future cash flow.
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In the first round, the subjects in the role of auditors were presented with the task in which
they had to approve accounting of development costs of the product X as an intangible
asset in the balance sheet of the client's company or as an expense in the profit and loss
account of the client's company. The clients seated with the auditors had the financial
interest to persuade the auditors to support their preference for the development costs
to be accounted for as intangible assets. That means the auditor needed to agree with
rather optimistic predictions about the development of the product X and its future cash
flows. The second alternative was based on more realistic predictions about future cash
flows, requiring expensing the costs of development in the profit and loss account. Both
alternatives were allowed by the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS),
however, it was clear that the second alternative is more adequate, as in line with the
theory of motivated reasoning, the decision at stake was ambiguous enough to facilitate
directional goals to take place.
The auditor compensation scheme is designed in a way that enables the auditor to maximise
the reward by not acting in the interest of the client. On the other hand, as the client’s
compensation is dependent on the company’s profit, the client’s compensation scheme
is designed to make the client eager to convince the auditor to support their preference.
In the non-personal relationship of the study, there was no communication between the
auditor and the client, however, the auditor was aware that the client’s reward is calculated
based on the auditor’s decision and what is more, that the client’s decision of hiring the
same auditor in the next round depends on the client’s decision. Whenever the auditor
chose the option not in the interest of the client, the auditor received EUR 5 as a fixed fee,
while the clients earned EUR 0. Further, if the auditor opted for the alternative in favour
of the client, the author earned EUR 3 and so did the client. With financial incentives
attached to the choices, our intention was to model an auditor business risk of impaired
independence. Paying the auditor a smaller fee for the choice compliant with the client’s
interests captures the reputational and legal costs of an audit failure due to lack of auditor
independence.
The second round represented the following audit period and in it the clients were requested
to decide whether to hire the same auditor or a different one based on the decision of the
auditor from the first round. In both cases, the client’s reward amounted to either EUR 3
or EUR 0. If the client decided to hire the same auditor, the reward was dependent on the
subsequent choice of the auditor. However, if the client chose not to hire the same auditor
in the second round, the client’s outcome was determined by the random choice of the
computer system, representing the choice of a new unknown auditor. The choice of the
client to hire the same auditor depended on perceived probability that the auditor would
select the option in the client’s interest. The auditor’s reward could be the same as in the
first round if hired again (EUR 5 or EUR 3), but in case of a job loss the auditor’s reward
could only amount to EUR 1 or EUR 0 with equal probability, depending on the random
number drawn by the computer.
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In total, auditor could earn the most by not acting in the interest of the client (EUR 10),
while total compensation of both the auditor and the client could be maximised in case of
cooperation (EUR 6 + 6).
The above presented auditor-client game, was designed in Gambit software (McKelvey,
McLennan and Turocy, 2013) and programmed in E-prime 2.0 software (Psychology
Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA).
Procedure. The participants in the role of the auditor were randomly assigned to two
groups. In the non-personal relationship group of the study, the participating auditors and
clients were seated alone without being familiar with whom they were paired with. In the
personal relationship group, the auditors were seated with the clients who were either their
friends or not. Following the introduction and the initial instructions on the computer, the
auditors and the clients read the case and familiarised themselves with their tasks. Those
that were paired discussed the decision for about 10 minutes. The auditors seated alone
took their decision without any interaction with the clients. These auditors were aware
that in the next period the clients could hire a different auditor. However, neither the
auditors nor clients knew exactly how many more rounds there would be since the initial
instructions left the participants to believe several rounds would be played. Based on the
auditor’s decision in the first round, the individual rewards for both the auditor and client
were displayed on computer screens and experimental subjects received their rewards.
In the second round, the scenario was essentially the same as described in the paragraph
above. After reading the case and their tasks, the clients had to decide to hire either the
same auditor or a different one. Another negotiation round followed between the auditors
and the clients in the condition of a personal relationship. After the negotiation discussion,
the clients indicated their decision. On the contrary, in the non-personal group of the
study, no discussions took place. In the continuation, whenever the client decided to hire
the same auditor, a new negotiation followed with the auditor in the personal relationship
condition. On the other hand, whenever the client decided not to hire the same auditor,
the computer randomly determined the reward for both the auditor and the client.
In the end of the experimental task of the study, the involved participants completed a
questionnaire on motivational factors and unconscious needs, including demographic
questions.
Variable measurement. We manipulated the personal relationship variable in a way that
the first half of the participants was assigned to a non-personal relationship group (coded
by 0) and the other half of the participants to a personal relationship group (coded by 1).
The former did not know who they were paired with, while the latter were seated with
their counterparties.

M. LIČEN | LONG-TERM AUDITOR-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS: CONSCIOUS ...

47

A long-term relationship was incorporated in the study by focusing on familiarity that
develops over time in a close personal relationship between auditors and clients. As the
duration of the experiment was too short for familiarity to actually develop, we proxied
the familiarity part with friendship. The latter was manipulated only in the personal
relationship group in which almost half (46.8%, N = 22) of the auditors was randomly
paired with a client they did not know (coded by 0), and the other good half (53.2%, N =
25) of the auditors with the clients who they were good friends with (coded by 1). In other
words, in the selection process we randomly assigned students to the groups, where half
of the students who were assigned to the personal relationship group was asked to select
their friends from the remaining group of students. In the exit questionnaire, the students
involved confirmed they are good friends with each other.
The auditor’s decision is about supporting or not supporting the client’s preference.
The value 0 indicates the decision of the auditor to expense the development costs of a
product in the company’s profit and loss account. This option is contrary to the client’s
preference. The value 1 indicates the decision in favour of the client, which is approving
the development costs as an intangible asset in the balance sheet.
Financial interest is measured with three proxies, a short-term reward, long-term business
and the fear of losing a client and consequently financial income. The short-term reward
proxy measures the importance of the first round reward for the auditor’s decision, while
the long-term business one expresses the desire of the auditor to maintain future business
with the client. The variables are measured with the five-point Likert scale. The latter was
also applied in measuring fear of losing the client, with value 1 meaning the fear is not
influential at all, and 5 meaning it is highly influential.
According to McClelland (1987), there are three unconscious needs, that is the need for
achievement, affiliation and power respectively. Initially, all three of them were measured
with 27 items, firstly, to make a comprehensive screening of the needs, and secondly, to
obtain unidimensional measures for the needs. The indicated items were combined and
adapted from different questionnaires that report high reliability and validity (Boneva et
al., 1998). Participants had to indicate their agreement with the questionnaire statements
using the five-point Likert scale. Further, the items measuring the need for achievement were
adapted and combined from the Work and Family Orientation Questionnaire developed
by Spence and Helmreich (1983), and the Manifest Needs Questionnaire developed by
Steers and Braunstein (1976). The two applied examples of the items representing the need
for achievement are “I work very hard to continually improve my work performance” and
“I prefer to do things that require a high level of skill”.
The items measuring the need for power were adapted and combined from the Power
Motivation Scale developed by Schmidt and Frieze (in Frieze and Boneva, 2001), and the
Manifest Needs Questionnaire developed by Steers and Braunstein (1976). For these items,
the two examples of the statements representing the need for power are “I enjoy planning
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things and deciding what other people should do” and “I like to have a lot of control over
the events around me”.
Last, the items measuring the need for affiliation were adapted and combined from the
Mehrabian Affiliation Tendency Questionnaire (Mehrabian and Ksionzky, 1974) again in
combination with the Manifest Needs Questionnaire developed by Steers and Braunstein
(1976). For these items representing the need for affiliation two examples are provided,
one “I enjoy belonging to clubs, groups and other organizations” and the other “Having
friends is very important to me”.
To obtain a unidimensionality of the latent variables related to the unconscious needs, we
performed a factor and reliability analysis in SPSS. From the initial 27 items, six of items
were dropped from the analysis based on their low covariance with other measured items
and low reliability of each factor. A factoring was again conducted on the 21 retained items
with an orthogonal rotation. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test verified the sampling adequacy
for the analysis, with KMO = 0.76 (“good” according to Field, 2009), and all KMO values
for individual items higher than 0.55. The Bartlett’s test of sphericity x2(210) = 964.97,
p < 0.001, indicates correlations between items were sufficiently large for principal axis
factoring. Three factors extracted with the Anderson-Rubin method in combination
explained the 31.5% variance. The need for power and the need for achievement subscales
are reported to have relatively high reliability, with Cronbach’s α valued between 0.74
and 0.76. The need for affiliation, on the other hand, is less reliable with Cronbach’s α =
0.63. The final list of measurement items and their respective rotated factor loadings is
presented in the Appendix.
4

RESULTS

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample and the independent t-test of the
differences between the personal and non-personal relationship subgroup respectively.
The descriptive statistics reveals interesting dynamics of behaviour. In the first round,
the auditors who supported the client’s preference had to give up 40% of the short-term
reward in a hope to be re-appointed. When comparing the two subgroups, this expectation
was significantly higher in the personal relationship where the auditors were able to
communicate and negotiate face-to-face than in the non-personal relationship in which
the choices were the same but with no possibility to personally influence the counterparty.
Table 1 and 2 reveal that the auditors in the personal relationship significantly more
frequently decided to support the client, namely in 91.5% of instances, whereas in the
non-personal relationship only 58.3% of them accepted the decision in the client’s interest,
t = -4.00, p < .001.
In the second round, 74.7% of the clients decided to hire the same auditor again. This
decision significantly differed between both subgroups: the clients rehired the same
auditors in 95.7% of cases if in the personal relationship group versus 54.2% of cases
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in the non-personal relationship group, t = -5.29, p < .001. 88.7% of the hired auditors
were those who in the first round supported the decision in the interest of the client. In
the personal relationship, the clients rehired the auditor in 97.7% of cases if the auditor
opted for the client’s preference in the first round. Although a rehired auditor could have
maximised the outcome of the second round by not opting for the client’s preference, trust
in the auditor in the personal relationship setting outweighed the risk. In the non-personal
relationship, on the contrary, only 75.0% of the clients rehired the auditor who in the first
round supported their preference, as the trust that these auditors would support them also
in the second round was lower. The rehired auditors took another decision in the second
round and 73.2% of them decided in favour of the client. Overall, the final results show
the frequency of the rehired auditors was significantly higher in the personal relationship
group (84.4%) than in the non-personal one (53.8%), t = -2.69, p = .010.
The total auditor’s outcome in both rounds was slightly higher if the auditor was cooperating with the client. It is therefore not surprising that the total auditor’s outcome
is higher in the personal relationship group than in the non-personal one, nevertheless,
the difference is not significant, t = -.87, p = .389. In other words, not supporting the
client could bring the auditor practically the same total outcome. We designed financial
compensation with great care not to overwhelm the subtle influence of the affect and
unconscious need respectively. The results show the total client’s outcome was significantly
higher in the personal relationship group as the client’s outcome was heavily dependent
on the co-operation with the auditor, t = -4.32, p < .001. Also, the concern to maintain
long-term business and mutual trust are significantly stronger in the personal relationship
group, t = -3.47, p = .001, while other variables in the model do not significantly differ
between the subgroups.
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Table 1: Differences in means of variables
Full sample (N = 95)
Variable

Personal relationship
(N = 47)

Mean

Non-personal
relationship (N = 48)

Mean

Std. Dev.3

Friendship (N = 25)

.263

.443

.532***

.504

Auditor's decision

.747

.437

.915***

.282

Short-term reward

3.295

1.119

Long-term business

3.747

1.246

Fear of losing a client

3.095

1.264

3.234

1.220

2.958

1.304

Need for achievement

3.671

.612

3.639

.638

3.702

.591

Need for power

3.359

.673

3.228

.696

3.487

.632

Need for affiliation

3.624

.542

3.552

.612

3.694

.460

.957***

.204

.542***

6.383

.990

6.125

Client's decision

Statistics

Mean

Statistics

3.511
4.170***

Std. Dev.

1.061
.916

Statistics
.583***
3.083
3.333***

Std. Dev.
.498
1.145
1.389

.747

.437

Total auditor's outcome

6.253

1.458

Total client's outcome

4.305

2.109

5.170***

1.619

3.458***

2.202

.732

.446

.844**

.367

.538**

.508

Auditor’s decision in the
second round

Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; Significant differences appear in bold.

3 Standard Deviation

.504
1.806
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Table 2: Auditor's decision × Client's decision × Personal relationship cross-tabulation
Client's decision
Relationship
Nonpersonal

Auditor's
decision

Auditor's
decision

Auditor's
decision

Total

Total

Count
% within auditor's decision
% within client's decision
% of total

15
75.0%
68.2%
31.3%

5
25.0%
19.2%
10.4%

20
100.0%
41.7%
41.7%

For
client

Count
% within auditor's decision
% within client's decision
% of total

7
25.0%
31.8%
14.6%

21
75.0%
80.8%
43.8%

28
100.0%
58.3%
58.3%

Count
% within auditor's decision
% within client's decision
% of total

22
45.8%
100.0%
45.8%

26
54.2%
100.0%
54.2%

48
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

Against
client

Count
% within auditor's decision
% within client's decision
% of total

1
25.0%
50.0%
2.1%

3
75.0%
6.7%
6.4%

4
100.0%
8.5%
8.5%

For
client

Count
% within auditor's decision
% within client's decision
% of total

1
2.3%
50.0%
2.1%

42
97.7%
93.3%
89.4%

43
100.0%
91.5%
91.5%

Count
% within auditor's decision
% within client's decision
% of total

2
4.3%
100.0%
4.3%

45
95.7%
100.0%
95.7%

47
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

Against
client

Count
% within auditor's decision
% within client's decision
% of total

16
66.7%
66.7%
16.8%

8
33.3%
11.3%
8.4%

24
100.0%
25.3%
25.3%

For
client

Count
% within auditor's decision
% within client's decision
% of total

8
11.3%
33.3%
8.4%

63
88.7%
88.7%
66.3%

71
100.0%
74.7%
74.7%

Count
% within auditor's decision
% within client's decision
% of total

24
25.3%
100.0%
25.3%

71
74.7%
100.0%
74.7%

95
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

Total

Total

For auditor

Against
client

Total

Personal

Against
auditor
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The hypothesized model was analysed with logistic regression. Logistic regression is a type
of the probabilistic classification model used for predicting the outcome of a categorical
dependent variable, i.e. a class label based on one or more predictor variables that are either
binary or continuous. Our main dependent variable is the binary choice of the auditors,
while the independent variables are either binary (personal relationship, friendship) or
continuous (short and long-term financial interest, fear of losing a client and unconscious
needs).
Table 3 presents the results of logistic regression and Table 4 several statistics, relating
to the logistic regression models. The hypotheses are analysed in a stepwise approach to
observe the effects of the included variables on the explanatory power of the personal
relationship and to analyse the mediation effect. All tests of significance are two-sided,
with a p value of < 0.05, thus indicating statistical significance.
We present five models. The first model explains the 21.3% (Nagelkerke R2) variance in
the auditor’s choice compliant with the client’s interests, correctly classifies 74.7% of the
studied cases and is overall significant with χ2(1) = 11.45, p < 0.001. The results show
a positive and significant effect of the personal relationship on the auditor’s decision in
favour of the client, reflecting that auditors in a personal relationship are 7.68 times more
likely to decide in favour of the client’s interest (b = 2.04, p = .001).
In H1, we predict that familiarity mediates a positive effect of a personal relationship.
Nevertheless, the analysis shows that this is not the case. Friendship as a proxy for
familiarity is not found significant and a personal relationship after the inclusion of
friendship remains significant. In the third model, we include three variables, measuring
financial interest as a directional goal to test H2. The results in this case prove that
financial interest is the factor that explains a significant effect of the personal relationship.
By having a long-term future business interest, the auditor is 8.23 times more likely to
support the client’s preference (b = 2.11, p < .001), and by being very afraid of losing
the client and the consequent financial income, the auditor is 4.90 times more likely to
inappropriately consent to the client’s preferences (b = 1.59, p = .020). In other words, a
long-term future interest as a conscious and deliberate incentive of the auditor mediates
for the association between the personal relationship and the auditor’s decision. With its
inclusion in the model, the personal relationship ceases to be significant (b = .69, p = .624).
A short-term reward is expectedly not found significant as the auditors needed to give up
on the short-term reward for long-term future business, yet it proves to be an important
control variable. The model applied not only correctly classifies 92.6% of the cases, but is
also significant with χ2(5) = 27.74, p < 0.001, while the explanatory power is considerably
increased with the inclusion of financial incentives (Nagelkerke R2 from 23.2% to 81.1%).
In the fourth model, three more variables are added, testing the effects of the unconscious
needs for achievement (H3), power (H4) and affiliation (H5). Results reveal a significant
negative effect of the need for achievement (b = -1.68, p = .011) and a marginally significant
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negative effect of the need for power (b = -1.50, p = .071) on the auditor’s choice in the
client’s interest, as predicted. This confirms the prediction of H3 and H4 respectively. With
the inclusion of the unconscious needs in the model, a control variable short-term reward
becomes significant with a negative sign (b = -1.46, p = .021). This indicates the adequacy
of our incentive scheme design, in which the auditor could earn the most by not acting in
the interest of the client.
While on a stand-alone basis the effect of the need for affiliation is not found significant,
the final model (Model 5) shows that personal relationship reinforces the need for
affiliation to positively affect the auditor’s decision-making in favour of the client as the
interaction term is significant (b = 5.80, p = .026). This confirms the prediction of H6. In
a logistic regression, the true main effect is only meaningful when there is no interaction,
since when there is a significant interaction, the main effect cannot be unambiguously
interpretable. Thus, it is normal to ignore the main effects as informative in themselves
when an interaction occurs. The main effects of the personal relationship, friendship
and need for affiliation in the final model are therefore left out as their results cannot
be unambiguously interpretable. The Nagelkerke R2 of the comprehensive fifth model
increases to 89.0%, indicating that on one hand conscious incentives and on the other
hand unconscious needs contribute to the explanation of the auditor’s choices. In Figure 3,
we graphically present the empirical model.
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Table 3: Results of logistic regression, predicting the auditor’s decision in the client’s interest
B

(SE)

z

p-value

OR

2.04
.34

(.60)
(.29)

3.38
1.14

.001
.253

7.68

1.51
1.33
.34

(.69)
(1.20)
(.29)

2.19
1.11
1.14

.029
.267
.253

4.52
3.79

.69
3.31
-.45
2.11
1.59
-9.20

(1.41)
(2.34)
(.46)
(.58)
(.68)
(3.08)

.49
1.41
-.98
3.64
2.32
-2.99

.624
.158
.327
.000
.020
.003

2.00
27.26
.64
8.23
4.90

1.50
3.46
-1.46
3.50
2.21
-1.68
-1.50
-.57
-11.11

(2.12)
(2.91)
(.63)
(.93)
(.79)
(.66)
(.83)
(.68)
(3.04)

.71
1.19
-2.31
3.76
2.80
-2.55
-1.81
-.84
-3.66

.481
.235
.021
.000
.005
.011
.071
.403
.000

4.47
31.82
.23
33.24
9.11
.19
.22
.57

1.89
4.33
-2.85
5.52
2.88
-1.31
-2.00
-3.19
5.80
-13.54

(2.02)
(2.12)
(1.07)
(1.61)
(.86)
(.64)
(.78)
(1.43)
(2.61)
(3.60)

.93
2.05
-2.65
3.42
3.35
-2.05
-2.58
-2.23
2.22
-3.76

.350
.041
.008
.001
.001
.040
.010
.026
.026
.000

6.61
76.29
.06
248.76
17.86
.27
.13
.04
331.21

Model 1
Personal relationship
Intercept
Model 2
Personal relationship
Friendship
Intercept
Model 3
Personal relationship
Friendship
Short-term reward
Long-term business
Fear of losing a client
Intercept
Model 4
Personal relationship
Friendship
Short-term reward
Long-term business
Fear of losing a client
Need for achievement
Need for power
Need for affiliation
Intercept
Model 5 [Final model]
Personal relationship
Friendship
Short-term reward
Long-term business
Fear of losing a client
Need for achievement
Need for power
Need for affiliation
Personal relationship × Need for affiliation
Intercept

Note: Significant p-values appear in bold. Variables that cannot be unambiguously interpretable due to
significant interaction term in the model appear in grey.
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Table 4: Statistics of the logistic regression models

Number of observations
Number of variables

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

95

95

95

93

93

1

2

5

8

9

Wald χ2

11.45

10.64

27.74

25.15

22.50

χ2

.001

.005

.000

.002

.007

Pseudo R2

.138

.152

.704

.784

.817

Nagelkerke R2

.213

.232

.811

.868

.890

Figure 3: The empirical model

Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; Significant differences appear in bold. Variables that cannot be
unambiguously interpretable due to significant interaction term in the model appear in grey.
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5

DISCUSSION

The notion that auditor independence is affected by a long audit tenure during which the
auditor’s objectivity regarding a client gets impaired has been acknowledged for decades.
Despite the recent regulatory measures as are audit partner rotation and public oversight,
the problem seems to persist. The reason may lie in the fact that a long-term personal
relationship arouses loyalty or creates an emotional bond, which may in turn cause
conscious or unconscious biases (Ye et al., 2011). Other studies suggest that a personal
relationship gives rise to the existence of long-term financial incentive as a directional
goal that contributes to motivated reasoning and causes systematic biases (Kadous et al.,
2003; Kadous et al., 2008; Blay, 2005). Nevertheless, whether these biases are conscious or
unconscious is not explicitly addressed in the mentioned literature.
Our aim in this study is to shed more light on the question to what extent various incentives
inherent to the personal relationship and characteristics of a decision-maker account for
biases. Relying on the need theory of motivation (McClelland, 1987) and the theory of
motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990), our study extends the Moore et al. (2010) and the
Slapničar et al. (2015) study respectively in trying to measure whether bias in a personal
relationship is provoked by familiarity, i.e. emotional bond, by conscious self-interested
maximization of long-term financial outcome, or by unconscious needs.
Our findings suggest that decision-making in favour of the client in the personal relationship
is predominantly deliberate, although the decision to maximise long-term financial return
is not emotionally neutral. In a personal relationship, the auditor significantly more often
than in a non-personal relationship conceded to the client’s preference because they more
strongly trusted the clients to hire them in the next period. Interestingly, we find that
familiarity, or friendship, as operationalised in our experiment, does not contribute to
mutual trust and confidence in a long-term co-operation, but anyway proves to be of
crucial importance when it comes to knowing how “one plays the game”.
We also find that unconscious needs significantly affect the auditor’s choices in a predicted
way, for example the need for achievement and the need for power respectively induce
auditor independence, while the need for affiliation is accentuated in a personal relationship,
rending the auditor to more likely consent to the client’s preferences. The results of our
study allow us to infer that both conscious financial incentives and unconscious needs
influence subjects’ decisions simultaneously, however, it depends on the context to what
extent they develop.
Understanding the drivers of the auditor’s decision-making has a practical value for
the development and implementation of effective regulatory measures. In a longlasting relationship, both financial and non-financial incentives impair the auditor’s
independence. While financial incentive may be effectively mitigated by the oversight
threat, the public oversight alone may not suffice to counteract unconscious motives. The
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persisting familiarity threat lead the European Commission to propose a mandatory audit
firm rotation with a rotation period of six years for the first time in 2013. In 2014, the
European Parliament proposed the revised audit directive (Directive 2014/56/EU) and
audit regulation (Regulation No 537/2014), requiring a 10-year mandatory audit firm
rotation. Nevertheless, despite the legal changes in the field of auditing, such a long rotation
period is unlikely to effectively address any of the problems, arising from familiarity issues.
Needs are relatively stable personality characteristics, and so understanding their effects
on auditor independence has practical implications also for the employment of auditors
in audit firms. Since a high need for achievement and a high need for power respectively
result in greater auditor objectivity and, quite on the contrary, a high need for affiliation
which impairs auditor objectivity, the recruitment process should give more emphasis
on screening the interviewed individual’s personality traits. Making auditors aware of
subconscious factors that bias their decision-making in the regular ethics trainings and
codes of conduct is another approach to minimize the impact of personality traits.
6

LIMITATIONS

The results of our study are to be weighed in the light of its limitation, despite the fact the
experimental analysis was carefully conducted,. The first limitation of the study is in the
investigation of long-term periods, where a long-term relationship was proxied with a tworound game and the uncertainty of future business, the latter applied by not informing the
participants about how many rounds there would actually be. However, the subjects were
left to think several rounds would be played. The long-term relationship was additionally
reinforced by pairing real friends and using their friendship as a proxy for familiarity.
Thus, we believe our focus on studying the long-term auditor-client relationship is valid.
The second limitation and probably our greatest may be in the fact that instead of
experienced auditors students participated in the study. We tried to minimize this
limitation, however with success to only some extent, by inviting only accounting and
finance students who are most familiar with the audit profession and regulation. Students
had on average 3.6 years of work experiences, many of them in positions of audit assistants
in audit firms. Furthermore, all the included students also attended a lecture on ethics in
accounting and auditing before the research experiment.
The use of undergraduate and graduate students as subjects in the laboratory experimental
research is quite frequent. In the field of psychology, while studying 54 laboratory
experimental research studies published in 1988 in the Journal of Applied Psychology
(JAP), Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, and Personnel Psychology,
Dipboye (1990) found that most researches (81.5%) in their studies used students as
subjects, whereas professionals, managers and technical people were used only few times
(7.4%). Students have also frequently been used as subjects in the field of behavioural
research in accounting (Ashton and Kramer, 1980) and financial accounting studies
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(Elliott et al., 2007). While reviewing 369 experimental papers published between 1994
and 2007 in six world’s best accounting journals (Accounting, Organizations and Society
(AOS), The Accounting Review (AR), Contemporary Accounting Research (CAR),
Journal of Accounting and Economics (JAE), and Journal of Accounting Research (JAR),
Behavioral Research in Accounting (BRIA)), Chan, Landry and Troy (2011) report that
slightly more than half (52.03%) of the researches used students as subjects, while others
used practitioners. Regardless of the use of students as experimental subjects, these studies
have made relatively significant contributions to the accounting literature. According to
Mortensen, Fisher and Wines (2012), the use of advanced level accounting students as
surrogates for accounting practitioners is appropriate, especially in a relatively structured
decision context.
Overall, we believe the limitations of the study underestimate rather than inflate the
results and that the study contributes to a deeper explanation of the adverse effect of a
personal relationship on auditor independence by analysing its antecedents and the
parallel influence of unconscious needs. Since the study is aimed to be interdisciplinary,
in the search for novel insights it fruitfully combines auditing, finance and psychology. Its
uniqueness lies in the fact that it addresses the problem of auditor independence from a
different perspective.
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APPENDIX
INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUDITOR
FIRST ROUND
You are an auditor working for a reputable audit firm Auditor007. You are well aware of
the importance of your professional reputation and the fact that the auditor is primarily
bound to serve the public interest. You are currently auditing the accounts of a large public
company Smart Firm. This is a technological company. This year the company developed
a product X. The development costs of product X in this year amounted to EUR 2 million.
The development costs can be accounted for as either an intangible asset in the balance
sheet which does not have a negative impact on earnings in the current period, or an
expense in the profit and loss account which negatively affects profit. Both alternatives are
allowed by the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS). The method according
to which the company recognizes the development costs of the product in the accounts of
the company depends on the management's and auditor’s assessment of the likelihood that
the product would be completed and successfully launched on the market.
Manager of the company Smart Firm is confident that the company is able to successfully
complete the product, launch it on the market and receive considerable cash flows from
sales within two years. Taking into consideration the optimistic predictions, the manager
believes that the development costs of the product X should be accounted for in the
balance sheet as an intangible asset. Under such treatment the development costs will not
have a negative impact on the company's profit, which will amount to EUR 1 million.
Because product X is a technologically innovative product, there are alternative forecasts
based on the past experience of the company. Scepticism about the existence of the market
and costumers for the product due to financial crisis and a decline in the demand for
the product cast doubt on the forecasted cash flows from sales in two years. Taking into
consideration the alternative forecasts, the development costs of the product X should
be presented in the profit and loss account as an expense, however, this would have a
negative impact on the company's profit which would turn into a loss of EUR 1 million.
The company manager's reward is based on the performance of the company.
Your task is to decide how the development costs of the product X should be accounted
for in the accounts.
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Your outcome depends on your decisions. If you decide that the development costs of the
product X should be accounted for as an asset in the balance sheet, the manager will earn
EUR 3 and you will earn EUR 3. On the other hand, if you decide that the development
costs of the product X should be expensed, the manager will earn EUR 0 and you will earn
EUR 5.
If the manager will not be satisfied with your work, he or she can decide to hire a different
auditor in the next period. In case you are rehired, you can earn EUR 3 or EUR 5, depending
on your decision in the next period. If you are not hired again in the next period, your
outcome will amount to either EUR 1 or EUR 0 (depending on a random number in the
computer).
Please make a decision on how the development costs of the product X should be
accounted for in the accounts of Smart Firm.
DISCUSS YOUR DECISION WITH THE MANAGER.
TO CONTINUE, PRESS ENTER ON THE COMPUTER KEYBOARD.
SECOND ROUND
One year has passed and if you are rehired by the manager, you have to decide again
how the development costs of the product should be accounted for in the accounts. The
company Smart Firm developed a new product Y this year. The development costs of the
product Y this year is EUR 3 million.
The manager of the company is confident the company is able to successfully complete
the product, launch it on the market and receive considerable cash flows from sales within
two years. Taking into consideration the optimistic predictions, the manager believes the
development costs of the product Y should be accounted for in the balance sheet as an
intangible asset. Under such treatment the development costs will not have a negative
impact on the company's profit, which will amount to EUR 2 million.
Because product Y is a technologically innovative product, there are alternative forecasts
based on the past experience of the company. Scepticism about the existence of the market
and costumers for the product due to the financial crisis and a decline in the demand
for the product cast doubt on the forecasted cash flows from sales in two years. Taking
into consideration the alternative forecasts, the development costs of the product y should
be presented in the profit and loss account as an expense however, this would have a
negative impact on the company's profit which would turn into a loss of EUR 1 million.
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The manager's reward is based on the performance of the company.
Your outcome depends on the manager’s decision on whether you will be rehired or
not.
The manager has to decide whether he/she will hire the same auditor again or hire a
different one.
If the manager decides to rehire you, you can earn EUR 3 or EUR 5 and manager EUR 3 or
EUR 0, depending on your decision on how the development costs of the product Y should
be accounted for in the company’s accounts.
However, if the manager decides to hire a different auditor, due to the loss of business you
can earn only EUR 1 or EUR 0, depending on the random number selected by the computer.
In this case the manager’s outcome will also be randomly selected by the computer.
DISCUSS YOUR DECISION WITH THE MANAGER AND WAIT FOR HIS/HER
DECISION.
TO CONTINUE PRESS ENTER ON THE COMPUTER KEYBOARD.
EXIT QUESTIONNAIRE
1. For each of the following fifteen statements indicate your level of agreement with the
statements on a five-point Likert scale (1 = I completely disagree, 2 = I disagree, 3 = neutral,
4 = I agree 5 = I completely agree).
Below we present the final list of the measurement items evaluating unconscious needs
and their respective rotated factor loadings.
Rotated factor loadings
Factor
Items

Need for
Affiliation

Need for
Achievement

Need for
Power

Q1

I work very hard to continually improve my work
performance.

-.037

.544

.032

Q2

I enjoy competition. I like to win in sports and other things
I do.

.091

.467

.233

Q3

It is important to me to be liked by other people.

.351

.013

.073

Q4

I enjoy difficult challenges. At work, I like to take on the
hard jobs.

.010

.795

.198
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Rotated factor loadings
Factor
Items

Need for
Affiliation

Need for
Achievement

Need for
Power

.295

-.127

.072

Q5

If I disagree with someone, I let them know it. I am not
afraid of disagreement.

Q6

When working, I often chat with fellow employees about
non-work matters.

Q7

It annoys me when other people perform better than I do.

Q8

It is important to me to get people to agree with my ideas.

.209

.042

.410

Q9

Many of my co-workers are also my friends. I enjoy
spending my leisure time with them.

.383

-.140

.142

Q10

I would rather learn easy fun games than difficult thought
games. (R)

Q11

I enjoy being a manager. I like being in charge of things and
people.

.192

.393

.590

Q12

I enjoy belonging to clubs, groups and other organizations.

.532

.157

.255

Q13

I prefer to do things that require a high level of skill.

-.065

.679

.072

Q14

I like to have a lot of control over the events around me.

-.104

.131

.603

Q15

Having friends is very important to me.

.556

-.234

.000

Q16

I work better when there is a deadline.

Q17

I enjoy planning things and deciding what other people
should do.

.002

.121

.550

Q18

I have very few close friends. (R)

.350

.052

-.202

Q19

I typically set realistic goals. I tend to achieve my goals.

Q20

I dislike being the centre of attention at large gatherings. (R)

.250

.292

.200

Q21

When I am not feeling well, I would rather be with others
than alone.

Q22

It is important to me to perform better than others on task.

-.216

.375

.327

Q23

It is not necessary to hold an important position in life. (R)

.138

.333

.269

Q24

I enjoy a good movie more than a big party. (R)

.460

.030

-.003

Q25

Once I undertake a task, I persist.

-.122

.579

.058

Q26

I find satisfaction in having influence over others.

.065

.131

.731

Q27

I prefer independent work to cooperative effort. (R)

.520

.146

-.106

Eigenvalues

1.80

4.15

2.56

% of variance

8.57

19.75

12.33

Α

.63

.76

.74

Note: Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Factor Scores Method: Anderson-Rubin. Factor loadings over .40 appear in bold. Cronbach’s α appears in bold.
(R) indicates the reversed item. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 6 items eliminated from the final analysis
due to their low covariance with other measured items where the low reliability of each factor appears in grey.
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2. For each of the following factors indicate how important they were for your decision
by using a five-point Likert scale (1 = not important at all, 3 = somehow important, 5 =
very important).
Not important
at all

Somehow
important

Very
important

a. Short-term reward

1

2

3

4

5

b. Long-term business relationship

1

2

3

4

5

c. Fear of losing a client

1

2

3

4

5

d. Client’s reward*

1

2

3

4

5

e. Company’s profit*

1

2

3

4

5

Note: *these factors were not included in further analysis.

3. Please answer the following demographic questions.
Gender?

F

M

What is your age? ____________
Are you an undergraduate or a graduate student?
What is your field of study? Accounting

Undergraduate
Finance

How many years of work experience do you have? __________

Graduate
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